It has been 25 years since the country embarked on its post-reform decentralization journey, marked by the enactment of Law No. 22/1999 on regional administrations, which was later revised through Law No. 32/2004 and, most recently, Law No. 23/2014.

The fundamental shift from the centralized governance of the New Order era to decentralization during the reform era lies in the underlying values. While the New Order prioritized regional economic growth and governance efficiency, decentralization after 1999 was rooted in political and democratic ideals and sought to boost public engagement in regional politics and policymaking.

After a quarter century, Indonesia’s decentralization policy warrants critical review and strategic recalibration, especially as the current government and the House of Representatives prepare to revise the law.

According to the Home Ministry’s 2024 regional administration performance evaluation, published in April 2025, a substantial number of regional administrations continue to demonstrate poor or very poor performance.

At the provincial level, only nine out of 33 provinces (27 percent) achieved a “high performance” rating, and 17 provinces (51 percent) were rated “moderate,” while 7 provinces (21 percent) were rated “low” or “very low.” One of the legal entanglements surrounded its governor.

Performance at the municipal and regency levels was markedly weaker. Only 56 cities and regencies (11.5 percent) were rated high for performance, while 288 (59 percent) were moderate. Another 107 regions (22 percent) were rated low, and 34 (7 percent) were very low. Meanwhile, 23 cities and regencies were not rated due to legal issues, failure to submit performance reports, or absence of internal performance reviews.

The majority of low-performing and unrated regional administrations are in eastern Indonesia and the so-called 3T (disadvantaged, frontier, and outermost) regions, highlighting persistent disparities in governance capacity and development progress across the country.

The evaluation used macro indicators such as the human development index (HDI), poverty rate, unemployment rate, economic growth, per capita income, and income inequality. Its findings indicate that decentralization has not significantly improved national and regional development outcomes, and many regional administrations continue to struggle with governing effectively and efficiently.

Since the reform era, the design of decentralization in Indonesia has been symmetric (uniform) across provincial, municipal, and regency administrations. This means the central government has assumed that all regions possess similar potential, needs, and capacities, thereby implementing a uniform model of local governance that covers the types and numbers of delegated authorities, direct elections of regional heads, and fiscal transfers from the central government, as well as organizational and staffing structures.

The symmetric decentralization model has likely contributed to the inability of many regional administrations to carry out their functions due to limited bureaucratic capacity, low local revenue, and lack of community readiness to participate actively in public policy and governance.

Several root problems have emerged over the last 25 years of symmetric decentralization.

First, vertical coordination and collaboration between the central government, provinces, cities, and regencies remain weak. In sectors like education, health, and public works, planning and implementation are often poorly synchronized.

In practice, the strategic plan (Renstra) and annual program and budget plan (RKAKL) of state ministries and agencies are rarely synchronized with those of regional agencies. This leads to technical inconsistencies and tug-of-war dynamics in the implementation of programs and activities designed to achieve performance targets for specific government functions.

Additionally, many central government policies are poorly understood and difficult to implement at the regional level. This is due in part to technical ministries often lacking representation at the local level and frequently suboptimal coordination between ministries/agencies and the Home Ministry.

Second, the delegation of functions to regional administrations has not been accompanied by adequate guidance and oversight to strengthen institutional capacity. Local bureaucratic capacity remains generally low and uneven across regions, resulting in serious challenges in planning and implementing development programs.

This is evident in the RKAKL of regional agencies, where many programs are activity-oriented and lack clearly defined outcome and impact indicators.

Furthermore, planning remains fragmented with poor alignment of development outcomes across regional agencies, resulting in incoherence in program implementation. With the burden of uniformly delegated responsibilities under a symmetric model, many regional administrations lack the necessary capacity to perform effectively.

Third, there has been widespread abuse of authority among regional leaders and bureaucrats. According to data from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), 601 corruption cases occurred between 2004 and 2023 that involved regional leaders and civil servants, with 167 regional heads named as suspects.

One major driver of this abuse is the high cost of regional head elections, which pressures elected officials to recover political expenses through bureaucratic channels, such as public procurement, government appointments, social assistance programs, and permit issuance. This practice has led to increasing politicization and a decline in professionalism in the bureaucracy.

Indonesia’s symmetric approach to decentralization has been proven to contribute significantly to the poor performance of many regional administrations. Disparities in bureaucratic capacity and societal maturity across regions make it unrealistic to expect all regional administrations to effectively manage the same set of functions.

An asymmetric model is needed to improve decentralization. This means delegating authority and functions based on each region’s financial health and bureaucratic preparedness. The central government can create indicators to assess each administration’s readiness, to then define the scope of their delegated powers.

For instance, regional administrations could be classified into three levels of institutional maturity: fully autonomous (high), partially autonomous (medium), and limited autonomy (low). These classifications should be reevaluated every five years to give regional administrations a structured chance to enhance capacity and move toward greater autonomy.

As for electing local heads, not all regional administrations need to hold direct elections. The central government could establish categories based on societal maturity and fiscal capacity to determine the appropriate electoral mechanism.

Regions with stronger public education and sufficient financial resources might be granted the right to hold direct elections. Conversely, areas with weaker civic education and limited funds could opt for indirect elections through the local legislature. For underdeveloped regions, it might be more fitting for the central government to appoint regional heads, as is done with acting regional heads.

Future decentralization policies could also adopt an asymmetric design shaped by both political considerations and technical evaluations. While this approach is likely to spark debate and add complexity to policy development and execution, it could ultimately become a valuable, shared learning experience in the country’s ongoing nation-building journey.

By: Prof. Dr. Eko Prasojo, Mag.rer.publ a professor of public administration 

Source The Jakarta Post